Hong Kong, China — In terms of Taiwan’s general strategic posture, the military machinery that the Kuomintang, or Nationalist Party, has inherited after winning the general election recently is in fact in a state of crisis. Taiwan’s military build-up has been neglected for eight years, with military spending decreasing year by year except for a slight increase in 2008.
Over the past eight years, the only major military equipment Taiwan has acquired is the Keelung (KIDD) Class DDGs, or guided missile destroyers. During the same eight years, however, China’s military has been acquiring third-generation fighters at a rate of two combat regiments each year – one regiment of J-11 serial fighters and one regiment of J-10A fighters. The PLA Navy has also been expanding its fleet, building or importing one 6,000-ton-plus large surface battleship each year. It has also commissioned 052B, 052C, 051C and 956EM DDGs were all during the same time period. In addition, the PLA Army’s T-99G and T-96G main battle tanks have undergone two major upgrades in the last eight years, a pace much faster than neighboring Japan and South Korea.
China’s weapons of mass destruction include new cruise missiles and new-generation DF-21C SSMs, or surface-to-surface missiles, which have been constantly added to its stockpiles. China’s supply of short-range SSMs has also been increasing at an annual rate of 50-100. Moreover, within the same eight years, four SSN submarines and SSBN ballistic missile submarines have been commissioned.
In 2000, China’s military budget was only US$14.9 billion, whereas Taiwan’s military spending was approximately NT$273 billion (US$8.2 billion). By 2008, however, China’s military spending has jumped to a dramatic US$58.7 billion, while Taiwan’s military budget is around NT$350 billion (US$10.9 billion), about 3 percent of its GDP.
Of course, there is no such issue as implicit military spending in Taiwan’s defense budget, whereas China’s actual military spending is at least two times the official figure published by the Chinese government. This means that Taiwan’s current military budget is only one-tenth of China’s total military spending.
Just eight years ago, U.S. President George W. Bush promised to sell Taiwan eight submarines. Unfortunately, eight years later the project is still only on paper. In contrast, the PLA Navy procured eight KILO 636M SS submarines, all of which are now in service.
Moreover, during the same eight years, China has also been expanding its underwater fleet at a rate of 1.5 039A and “Yuan” class submarines each year. In the area of advanced multi-role fighters alone, China has imported 100 Su-30MKK/MK2s during this time, whereas Taiwan did not purchase any new combat aircraft. Nor did it procure any surface battleship or submarine except for one retired Keelung Class DDG from the United States. Taiwan virtually wasted the whole of eight years in its military development.
Under this circumstance, quite a number of U.S. and Japanese military strategists find it hard to understand the statement by Taiwan’s new President Ma Ying-jeou that there would be “no arms race” with China. With respect to the current reality in the Taiwan Strait, the key problem lies not in whether Taiwan engages in an arms race, but that China’s military build-up has developed to such an extent that China’s neighbors – including Japan, Russia and India – have become increasingly worried.
Even if Taiwan abides by its earlier promise and increases its military spending to 3 percent of its total GDP in the next four years, the most optimistic estimate is that Taiwan’s total military spending each year will not be able to surpass US$15 billion.
The military advantage that China has already achieved appears irreversible. Another factor that has to be taken into consideration is Taiwan’s immense national debt. The outstanding debt of the central and local governments combined has grown to a stunning NT$4.1 trillion (US$134 billion), and inflation is also worsening on the island.
Politically, the Kuomintang’s “one China consensus” will take cross-strait relations back to the age of a relationship between “two special states,” similar to the status around 1992. In that event, two-way cooperation and exchanges will be boosted, talks between the two semi-official bodies – the Taipei-based Strait Exchange Foundation and Beijing-based Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait – will very likely be resuscitated, which is what the United States appears to have been encouraging the two sides to do.
Yet at the bottom of their hearts, U.S. and Japanese strategists are more concerned than eight years ago over any hasty rapprochement between the two sides in establishing a security mechanism for the Taiwan Strait.
Japanese strategists tend to believe that the “three links” – trade, transport and postal services – between Taiwan and China will make
By Andrei Chang
Column: Military Might
Taiwan “Chinized” at a very fast pace. Some Japanese strategists are also worried that once China and Taiwan sign a peace agreement, the balance of power in East Asia will completely tilt in favor of China.
On the other hand, the Americans are more concerned that a number of high-level Kuomintang officials have already visited China and established close private ties with China’s top leaders. Will these ties mean a much closer integration between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait? Evidently, what the United States and Japan really want is the long-term maintenance of the current “no war and no peace” status, rather than any breakthrough in the status quo.
(Andrei Chang is editor-in-chief of Kanwa Defense Review Monthly, registered in Toronto, Canada.)
